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SyrinxTechnologies

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Security in a Virtualized World

Presented by:

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- The opinions expressed here are the views of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of TBL Networks.
- I will freely admit that I am not a VMware expert or systems administrator. I focus solely on how to exploit weaknesses in the system. If you see something that doesn't look right, feel free to ask questions.
- I am not perfect, although I try to be and realize I fail miserably. You have been warned.



- Speaker Introductions
- Presentation Introduction
- Systems Administration
- Virtual Vulnerabilities
- Virtualization and Compliance
- Points to Remember
- Links
- Demo
- Q/A



- B.S. – Information Systems – VCU
- M.S. – Computer Science – VCU
- President, Syrinx Technologies since 2007
- Member of ISSA, HIMSS, InfraGard, ILTA
- Adjunct Faculty in Information Systems & Computer Science at VCU, FTEMS lecturer
- CISSP, former CCIE in R/S for 9 years
- Published author
- Over 25 Years in the Industry



- Account Engineer for TBL Networks
- VMware Certified Design Expert (VCDX) number 46
- First VCDX in Virginia
- Published Author on the topic of virtualization technologies
- Specializing in virtualization technology since 2004



- Recently attended the SANS 577 Virtualization Security Fundamentals class
 - “VMware is a high performance virtualization platform, it is not a security platform.”
- The clear implication is that when a choice was made between performance and security, performance always wins
- This presentation will focus on VMware ESX and ESXi



- How many people in the audience think that moving to a virtualized environment improves the overall security posture?
- How many people in the audience think that moving to a virtualized environment is neutral in regards to security?
- How many people think that virtualization makes the security challenge much harder than physical servers?



- Q: On which popular Linux platform is the Service Console for VMware ESX built?
- A: Redhat Enterprise Linux
- Q: On which Linux shell is the VMware ESXi command line built?
- A: BusyBox




- VMware Network Ports
- Patching Issues
- Auditing the System
- Hardening the System



Connections & Ports in ESX & ESXi

Including vCenter Server, Site Recovery Manager, VMware Consolidated Backup, VMware Data Recovery, VMware Update Manager, VMware Orchestrator and VMware Converter



VMware
Dudley Smith
Fri Jun 15 2012
v5.0



SERIOUSLY???



- You must start with patching the Hypervisor
- Then, move onto the various guest OSes
- Next, the major applications
- Don't forget about the "auxiliary" apps
 - Adobe Reader, Flash, Shockwave
 - iTunes, RealPlayer, Media Player, etc.
- What about patching offline VMs?
 - VMware recently purchased Shavlik
- How about snapshots and host profiles?



- How do we know if we're in the Matrix?
 - VMware MAC OUI Prefixes:
 - 00:50:56
 - 00:05:69
 - 00:0C:29
 - 00:1C:14
 - Popular Tools
 - Scoopy/ScoopyNG
 - Jerry
 - Redpill
 - VMDetect



- Best Practice Documents
 - VMware vSphere 4.0 Hardening Guide
 - Microsoft Hyper-V Security Guide
 - CIS Benchmarks for ESX
 - CIS Benchmarks for Citrix Xen
 - DISA Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) for ESX
- Perform a Virtualization Risk Assessment



- Auditing Tools
 - Configuresoft
 - Tripwire
 - DISA Gold disk
 - Core Impact
 - Tenable Nessus
 - Metasploit
 - Foundstone VIDigger



- NIC allocation
 - 2 NICs, 4 NICs, 6 NICs or even 8 NICs
 - Production traffic
 - Service Console traffic
 - VMKernel traffic
- Use vSwitch to properly VLAN traffic
 - 3 different DMZ models proposed by VMware



- Start by hardening the vCenter host
 - By default, local Windows Administrators group has administrative access to vCenter
 - Create a local user, grant full Admin role and remove local Administrators group from vCenter
 - Create a domain Global group for all vCenter admins, add this to a new local group and grant the new local group vCenter administrative access
 - Restrict network port access
 - TCP 443 – vSphere client access to vCenter
 - TCP/UDP 902/903 – used by different applications



- vCenter Databases
 - Oracle 10g and 11g
 - MS SQL Server 2005 SP2 & 2008
- Databases should be on a separate server
- Default Oracle accounts are installed
- Watch those default passwords!
- Review roles & privileges

- Logging
 - Monitor vCenter logs and set the logging level to “Warning”
 - ESX Log Rotation
 - Default 36 month – can be used to crash partition
- Configure banners for legal purposes
 - /etc/issue
 - /etc/issue.net
 - /etc/issue.emergency
 - /etc/motd
 - /etc/ssh/sshd_config
- IPTables can be used in ESX to modify firewall rules
 - vCenter will not show any changes made by IPTables



- Modify ESX access controls as needed
 - SSH
 - TCP Wrappers
 - GRUB password for single-user mode access
 - Some users & groups can be removed
 - Limit root console logon
 - Configure *sudo*
 - Disable unneeded services
 - Secure SNMP
 - ESX supports 1, 2c & 3 while ESXi supports 1 & 2c
 - Disable removable media



- Modify ESXi access controls as needed
 - No built-in firewall
 - No TCP Wrappers
 - No audit/monitoring tools built-in
 - Secure the management console
 - Set a root password
 - Investigate “Lockdown Mode”
 - Enable syslog through PowerCLI
 - Change root password via PowerCLI



- Modify guest access controls as needed
 - Start with the OS
 - You can disable Guest<->Host copy & paste
 - Log management
 - Disable unnecessary devices
 - Prevent connection & removal of devices if needed



- Virtualization Threats
 - VM Sprawl
 - Where exactly are my servers/data?
 - Lack of Visibility
 - How do we monitor inter-VM traffic?
 - Separation of Duties
 - Who manages what aspects of the virtual world?
 - Rights/Privileges
 - How do we manage access without giving away too many rights?



- July 28, 2011 [VMMSA-2011-0010](#)
- June 2, 2011 [VMMSA-2011-0009](#)
- May 5, 2011 [VMMSA-2011-0008](#)
- April 28, 2011 [VMMSA-2011-0007](#)
- April 28, 2011 [VMMSA-2011-0001.2](#)
- April 12, 2011 [VMMSA-2011-0005.2](#)
- March 29, 2011 [VMMSA-2011-0006.1](#)
- March 7, 2011 [VMMSA-2011-0004.1](#)
- February 10, 2011 [VMMSA-2011-0003.2](#)
- February 7, 2011 [VMMSA-2011-0002](#)



- Ed Skoudis & Tom Liston – SANSFIRE 2007
 - VMchat : allows VMware guests to chat with each other over the VMware communications channel
 - VMftp : allows VMware guests to transfer files back and forth using the VMware communications channel
 - VMdrag-n-sploit : extends these tools to include chat, ftp, and execute between a guest and host
 - VMcat : can be used to “tunnel” a command shell between guests and hosts



- To date, only PCI has specifically outlined how virtualization should be handled by auditors.
- In June 2011, the PCI Security Standards Council (SSC) Virtualization Special Interest Group released:
 - Information Supplement: PCI DSS Virtualization Guidelines
- First release of guidelines on how virtualization affects PCI compliance.

- PCI 2.2.1 - Implement only one primary function per server to prevent functions that require different security levels from co-existing on the same server. (For example, web servers, database servers, and DNS should be implemented on separate servers.)

Note: Where virtualization technologies are in use, implement only one primary function per virtual system component.



- **Scoping Guidelines:**

- Hypervisor

- If any virtual component connected to (or hosted on) the hypervisor is in scope for PCI DSS, the hypervisor itself will always be in scope.

- Guest

- An entire VM will be in scope if it stores, processes or transmits cardholder data, or if it connects to or provides an entry point into the CDE. If a VM is in scope, both the underlying host system and the hypervisor would also be considered in scope, as they are directly connected to and have a fundamental impact on the functionality and security of the VM.



- **Scoping Guidelines:**
 - Virtual Switch
 - Networks provisioned on a hypervisor-based virtual switch will be in scope if provisioned with an in-scope component or if they provide services or connect to an in-scope component. Physical devices hosting virtual switches or routers would be considered in scope if any of the hosted components connects to an in-scope network.
 - Virtual Desktops/Applications
 - Virtual applications and desktops will be in scope if they are involved in the processing, storage, or transmission of cardholder data, or provide access to the CDE.

- **General Recommendations:**

- Be very careful when mixing guests containing different levels of sensitive data.
 - In the virtual context, a VM of lower trust will typically have lesser security controls than VMs of higher trust levels
- Recognize dormant VMs and ensure they are properly protected.
 - Dormant VMs are also unlikely to have up-to-date access policies and may be excluded from security and monitoring functions, possibly creating an unchecked back-door to the virtual environment.



- There are no forensics tools that work with VMFS.
- You can't easily recover deleted files from VMFS.
- VMotion & SVMotion don't have granular bandwidth management.
- Make sure DNS and NTP are setup correctly.
- You can create users directly on the hosts that do not show up in vCenter.




- VMware
 - <http://www.vmware.com/security/advisories>
- Others
 - <http://packetstormsecurity.org/search/?q=vmware>
 - <http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities>
 - <http://secunia.com/advisories/vendor/300/>
 - https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Virtualization_InfoSupp_v2.pdf



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 - <http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities>
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


- Q: How many people think that there is no command-line support in ESXi?
- A: Press ALT-F1 at main screen, type the magic phrase (depending on version) and you should see a login prompt.
 - The root password is blank by default, just press ENTER.




The goal is to move the SRV02 VM from ESX01 to ESX02 using vMotion.


ESX01- ESXi 4.1



vMotion



ESX02 – ESXi 4.1




The goal is to move the SRV02 VM from ESX01 to ESX02 using vMotion.


ESX01- ESXi 4.1



vMotion



ESX02 – ESXi 4.1




On SRV02 is a file named “PII.TXT”:

mickey mouse	12345678
goofy	78910111
minney mouse	12131415


ESX01- ESXi 4.1



vMotion



ESX02 – ESXi 4.1



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
ESX01- ESXi 4.1



vMotion



ESX02 – ESXi 4.1




Enter the “Black Hat”.

He wants the PII.TXT file.





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